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Case No. 20160502-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

ANH TUAM PHAM,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, 372 P.3d 734 (Addendum A).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West
2009).

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Anh Pham shot Luis Menchaca in the groin at point-blank
range. Luis testified at the preliminary hearing, and Pham cross-examined
him without limitation. By the time of trial, Luis had returned to Mexico.
Despite diligent efforts, the State could not locate him. The trial court found
Luis unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony over
Pham’s confrontation objection.

Pham appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that,
under Crawford v. Washington, Pham’s right to confront Luis was satisfied
because Luis was unavailable and Pham had a prior opportunity to crossexamine him at the preliminary hearing.
Pham argues that a preliminary hearing can almost never afford an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. But in a long, unbroken line of
cases, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held the
opposite. And the court of appeals here did not foreclose the possibility
that a particular preliminary hearing might not afford such an opportunity.
It correctly held that this case fell outside that possibility.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. This Court granted review on the following question: “Whether
the court of appeals erred in concluding Petitioner had failed to
demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against
him was violated by the presentation of the victim[‘]s preliminary hearing
testimony at his trial.” Order, September 12, 2016.
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals’ decision
for correctness. Brierley v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ¶18, __ P.3d __.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum B:
United States Constitution, Amendment VI;
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.
Luis Menchaca and his girlfriend, Donna Olmeno, went to a 7-Eleven
to buy Slurpees. R291:6. There, they saw Anh Tuam Pham “bullying” two
boys on bikes. R292:15. Pham and his friend Yeth Yan—who had been
partying and “ran out of beer”—had gone to the 7-Eleven to resupply.
R293:61–62; R292:43, 57, 66. The four were not acquainted. R291:7.
From the moment they arrived, Olmeno had a “bad vibe, like there
was going to be problems,” because she saw Pham “picking on” the boys.
R292:18, 21, 35. As Menchaca and Olmeno entered the store, the boys asked
them for a ride. Wanting “no drama, no nothing,” Menchaca said no.
R292:21, R291:8.
Once back outside, standing next to his truck, Menchaca watched
Pham harass the boys again. R291:8. The boys again asked Menchaca for a
ride. Id; R292:22. Pham, who was only a few feet away, turned around and
asked Menchaca if he “wanted problems too.” R292:22, 39; R291:8-9.
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Menchaca said, “No.” Id. Pham repeated two or three times, “[D]o you want
problems too,” and Menchaca repeated each time: “No, I don’t want
problems.” R292:39.
Suddenly, Pham pulled a gun out of his pocket and pointed it at
Menchaca. R291:9. Menchaca’s girlfriend screamed, “[A]re you going to
shoot him? Are you going to shoot him when there is cops across the
street?” R292:24. Pham pointed the gun at Menchaca’s groin. State Exh. 4b.
“[W]atch me,” he said before shooting Menchaca. R292:24.
The single bullet produced three wounds, one right above
Menchaca’s penis on his right side, one through his scrotum on his left side,
and one in his leg, where the bullet is permanently lodged. State Ex. 3;
R291:9–10; R293:103-04.
While Menchaca jumped up and down, Pham hopped into his white
minivan and put it in reverse. R292:9–11, 26, 49–52, 94, 99; R293:71. Two
police officers—guns drawn—chased after Pham yelling “stop, police stop,
police, stop now.” R292:51–53, 78–80, 95. But Pham just “sped off.” R292:94.
Menchaca began to feel dizzy. R291:11. He sat down and stuck his
hand into the hole in his pants; it came out bloody. R291:11; R292:96. When
the officers found him, Menchaca was “holding between his legs.” R292:96.
They called the ambulance, and Menchaca was transported to the hospital,
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where he stayed for three days. 291:11; R292:96–97. The entire episode was
caught on tape by the outdoor 7-Eleven security camera. State Exh. 4a, 4b.
Pham and Yan ditched their minivan in the adjoining neighborhood.
R292:53. They stole a family’s running SUV with the father chasing after
them. R292:53–56; 293:10–14. The duo then threw Pham’s striped shirt into
some bushes, drove a few blocks, and abandoned the stolen SUV around
the corner from Yan’s fourplex—where they had been “partying” earlier in
the evening. R293:11, 13–14; R292:55, 66.
Police officers found Pham at that fourplex later that night. R293:33.
He was dressed in different clothes than on the security footage and as
reported by eyewitnesses. R292:70, 82; R293:22.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
Preliminary hearing. Four months later, Pham’s victim testified at the

preliminary hearing. Menchaca identified Pham and testified that Pham
was harassing the two boys on bicycles when Pham pulled out his gun and
shot him. R291:7–9. Menchaca also testified about his injuries. R291:9–11,
12–14. He testified that he felt dizzy, bled from his groin wounds, was in the
hospital for three days after the shooting, could not walk without pain for
two weeks, could not sleep at night without pain in the sole of his foot,
believed the bullet hit a nerve in his leg that caused problems with his big
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toe, returned to the hospital after two weeks to have x-rays because of the
pain, and could still feel the bullet lodged in his leg. R291:12-14.
Pham’s attorney cross-examined Menchaca. R291:14. The State’s
direct

examination spans

eleven pages,

R291:4–14;

Pham’s

cross-

examination spans thirteen R291:14–26. He asked Menchaca about his
background, marital status, failure to pay hospital bills, interactions with
police the day of the incident, relationship to those involved, ability to
perceive, memory, and details of the incident. Id. The State did not object to
any of counsel’s questions, and the trial court placed no limitations on
counsel’s cross-examination. Id. In cross-examination, Pham’s attorney
discovered that aside from harassing the two boys on bikes, Pham also
pushed them just before shooting Menchaca. R291:20.
Trial. By the time of trial, Menchaca was no longer in Utah. The State
tracked Menchaca to Mexico—first to Minchocan and then to Guanajuato—
but, even working with the Los Angeles Police Department, Foreign
Prosecution/Interpol, the State was unable to discover Menchaca’s
whereabouts or to procure his presence at trial. R104–108. Pham did not
then, and does not now, dispute that Menchaca was unavailable at trial.
During trial, over Pham’s objection, the court allowed the State to
read Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony into the record because
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Menchaca was unavailable to testify and Pham had cross-examined him at
the preliminary hearing. R292:41; R134–136.
The jury found Pham guilty of discharge of a firearm with serious
bodily injury, receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, obstructing
justice, and failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop. R274. The trial
court sentenced Pham to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for
felony discharge of a firearm; one to fifteen years for receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle; one to fifteen years for obstructing justice; and
zero to five years for failure to stop or respond at the command of an officer.
R278–79.
Court of Appeals’ decision.

Pham timely appealed, arguing that

admitting the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his
confrontation right because preliminary hearings were so limited in scope
that they could not afford an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.1
Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶9-10.

Pham argued that three aspects of

preliminary hearings rendered them inadequate opportunities for crossexamination: (1) the magistrate’s limited ability to determine credibility; (2)

Pham also argued in the court of appeals that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of discharge of a firearm with serious bodily
injury. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶8. The court of appeals rejected that
claim, and he does not seek certiorari on that issue.
1
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the magistrate’s duty to draw all reasonable inferences in the prosecution’s
favor; and (3) the State’s low burden of proof. Id. at ¶¶13-14, 16; see generally
State v. Jones, 2016 UT 4, 365 P.3d 1212 (discussing preliminary hearing
standards).
The court of appeals—consistent with its own, this Court’s, and the
United States Supreme Court’s precedent—disagreed. Pham, 2016 UT App
105, ¶¶11-12 (citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 1014). The
court explained that neither its own precedent “nor Crawford [v. Washington]
state a blanket rule that an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at a
preliminary hearing will always, as a matter of law, satisfy a defendant’s
right to confrontation.” Id. at ¶12. “Rather,” the court continued, it
understood “those cases to set forth the general proposition that it is possible
for the cross-examination opportunity at a preliminary hearing to satisfy
that right.” Id. Because Pham did not allege that his motive changed
between preliminary hearing and trial, the trial court did not limit his crossexamination in any way, and Pham did “not identify any shortcomings in
the cross-examination” at preliminary hearing, the court of appeals held
that he did not show a confrontation violation. Id. at ¶¶18-19 & n.4.
The court of appeals explained that the characteristics of preliminary
hearings do not “limit the ability of a defendant to conduct a full cross-
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examination” because they “impose[d] no obvious structural limitation on
the scope or depth of cross-examination” in that setting. Pham, 2016 UT
App 105, ¶17. Thus, the court could not “conclude that cross-examinations
conducted within Utah’s preliminary hearing framework can never satisfy a
defendant’s” confrontation rights. Id. (citing State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537
(Utah 1981). The court likewise refused to decide “whether the inverse
[was] true”—that is, whether preliminary hearings always satisfy a
defendant’s confrontation rights. Id. at ¶18.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pham argues that because a preliminary hearing is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for
trial, there is less motive to cross-examine, which renders that prior
opportunity inadequate to satisfy the confrontation right. This position
contradicts over a century of precedent from the United States Supreme
Court, this Court, and the court of appeals.

Pham has provided no

compelling reason to depart from this precedent, particularly where the
United States Supreme Court has considered—and rejected—the sort of
arguments he makes. Under this long, unbroken line of precedent, Pham’s
prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing
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satisfied his right to confront him when he became unavailable to testify at
trial.
Preliminary

hearings

in

Utah—notwithstanding

their

limited

purpose—retain the relevant attributes that the Supreme Court has held
make them “trial-like”: witnesses are placed under oath, testify at a
recorded hearing in front of a judge, the defendant is represented by
counsel, and he has a rule-based right to cross-examine.

And defense

counsel is animated by the same motive and interest—to further the
defendant’s chances of success—at preliminary hearing no less than at trial,
notwithstanding a state constitutional amendment permitting the State to
present reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings. Further, the concerns that
Pham points to—such as a judge limiting cross-examination—do not apply
to his case.
The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham’s proposed
rule. Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination “absent exceptional
circumstances.” In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
declarant is generally admissible absent exceptional circumstances, such as
where a magistrate significantly limits cross-examination on credibility
issues.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity
for cross-examining a witness who is unavailable to testify at
trial.
Pham argues that the court of appeals erroneously held that crossexamination at preliminary hearings takes place “under the same motive
and interest” as cross-examination at trial because the precedent on which
the court of appeals relied for this proposition—this Court’s decision in
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981)—was later overruled by state
constitutional amendment.2 Aplt.Br. 12-16. He also asserts that preliminary
hearings can almost never satisfy the confrontation clause because of their
Pham cites to this amendment as evidence of a confrontation
violation, Pet.Br. 5-6, 17, but his claim is made entirely under the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 12-13, 16, 26-27. Although he briefly references the state
constitution, id. at 13, he makes no separate argument regarding it, and his
constitutional argument relies solely on cases addressing the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See id. at 7, 12-28. He does not argue
that the state constitution was violated; rather, he asserts that a state
constitutional change shows a federal violation. Id. at 5-6, 17. And the Court
of Appeals addressed only a federal claim. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶319. This Court has “repeatedly refrained from engaging in state
constitutional law analysis unless ‘an argument for different analyses under
the state and federal constitutions is briefed’.” See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT
47 ¶16, 164 P.3d 397, 405 (quoting State v. Laferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5
(Utah 1988)). Because Pham has not separately briefed a state constitutional
claim—which would be unpreserved at any rate—the State confines its
analysis to the Sixth Amendment.
2
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“very limited” purpose of establishing probable cause, which does “not
allow . . . for purposeful and rigorous cross-examination.” Id. at 14, 16.
These factors, according to him, render preliminary hearings all but per se
inadequate opportunities for cross-examination. Id. at 22. Pham is mistaken.
A long, unbroken line of decisions from both the United States Supreme
Court and this Court show that preliminary hearing testimony can be
admissible at trial where the declarant is unavailable. This Court should
hew to that precedent, as Pham offers no compelling reason to depart from
it.
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” at trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 590.
But this right is not absolute. The Confrontation Clause applies only to
“testimonial” hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). A
hearsay statement is “testimonial” if, in making it, the declarant “bears
testimony” against a defendant. Id. at 51. Testimonial hearsay includes,
among other things, “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing.” Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68.
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But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at trial if (1) the declarant
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant about the prior statements. Id. at 68. Prior
testimony—whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing—has
long been admissible where these conditions are met.

Id. at 57 (citing

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 403 (1994).
Unavailability is not at issue here. The trial court found the victim
unavailable, R292:41, R134–136, and Pham does not contest that ruling.
As to the second requirement, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only
the opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination”) (emphasis added). As this Court
has long recognized, even where a defendant “may have elected to forgo
cross-examination” that “does not mean that the opportunity was not
available.” State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht,
2002 UT 41, ¶39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see
also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App’x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Williams, 116 F. App’x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061
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(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008);
State v. Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Thus, satisfying the Sixth Amendment confrontation right does not
require that cross-examination will take place at all, let alone “crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish.”

United States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988)

(citations omitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ¶39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d
1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) (“Nothing in Crawford casts doubt on the continuing
vitality of Owens.”). Whether a prior opportunity is “adequate” depends on
the facts of a case.
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be
admissible at trial.3 More than a century ago, the United States Supreme

The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the
problems in Pointer—that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witness to
testify at trial—are not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding
preliminary hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally
involved circumstances—also not present here—where the declarant was
not truly unavailable. See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)
(preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible where State did not seek
presence); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable
due to negligence of government); see also State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929
(Utah 1973). (preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where
State had not proven unavailability).
3
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Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1985). Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory. Id.at 239. His
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which
resulted in a hung jury. Id. at 251. By the time of his third trial, two of the
witnesses against him had died. Id. at 240. The trial court permitted those
witnesses’ prior testimonies—in the form of reporter’s notes—to be read at
Mattox’s third trial. Id. He was convicted and appealed, claiming that
admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights. Id.
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that
“the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is
overwhelming.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added). In support, the court favorably
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which “the
substance of a deceased witness’ testimony given at a preliminary
examination was held to be admissible.” Id. at 242 (citing United States v.
Macomb, 5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702).
The court explained that the “primary object” of the confrontation
clause was “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination
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of the witness.” Id. at 242. Prior sworn testimony, the court explained, is
not the evil the confrontation clause targets. Id. The court understood that
its holding would “deprive[]” a defendant “of the advantage of that
personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed
for his protection,” but noted that the general rule “must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case,” and
that letting the guilty walk free in all cases where their accusers were no
longer available “would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may
be preserved to the accused.” Id. at 243. Thus, confrontation was satisfied
“in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and
subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.” Id. at 244 (emphasis
added).
Mattox’s holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years.
Though the language of Mattox itself was broad enough to include
preliminary hearings, the Supreme Court first addressed preliminary
hearings specifically nearly half a century ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 165 (1970).
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In Green, Porter sold marijuana to an undercover officer. 399 U.S. at
151. After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his supplier. Id. Porter
later testified for the State at Green’s preliminary hearing, where he was
cross-examined by defense counsel. Id. At trial, Porter again testified, but
became “markedly evasive and uncooperative,” claiming that he had
forgotten who his supplier was.

Id. at 151-52 (citation and quotation

omitted). The court admitted Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony to
impeach him. Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held that admitting
Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony violated Green’s confrontation
rights. Id. at 153.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could
“observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,” which
would aid “the jury in assessing his credibility.” Id. at 158. But the court
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the
Confrontation Clause—while it “may be true that a jury would be in a better
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statement if it could somehow be
whisked magically back in time to witness” it, the Constitution did not
require that. Id. at 160-61.
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Granted, Porter actually testified at Green’s trial, and was subject to
cross-examination on his prior statements. Id. at 161-62. But the Court’s
holding was not limited to that circumstance. The Court explained that
“Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible” under the
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his
preliminary hearing statement was “given under circumstances closely
approximating those that surround a typical trial,” which included:
•

Porter was under oath;

•

Green was represented by counsel;

•

Green’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant
limitation; and

•

the proceedings were held in front of a judge.

Id. at 165-66. Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not
“significantly different from an actual trial” for confrontation purposes, and
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S.
257).
It is true that Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980) and Crawford, which set out the current confrontation
requirements.

But both Roberts and Crawford show Green’s continuing

validity.
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Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. One of the
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita Isaacs—
Bernard’s daughter—who let Roberts stay at her apartment. Id. Anita
denied giving Roberts permission to use her father’s checks and credit
cards. Id. At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial
instruments “with the understanding that he could use them.” Id. at 59.
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts’ claim. Id.
Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause because there was “little incentive to cross-examine a
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable
cause.” Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted). The Supreme Court
reversed and re-affirmed Green, explaining that the preliminary hearing
afforded an “adequate opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. at 73 (citation
omitted).
True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so
long as they bore “adequate indicia of reliability.” Id. at 66 (quotation
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omitted). And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in
favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60.
But Crawford itself noted that Roberts’ result likely survived under the
Crawford test. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. This was so because, despite reciting
the “reliable hearsay” test that Crawford disavowed, the Roberts court
“hew[ed] closely to the traditional line” by admitting “testimony from a
preliminary hearing at which the defendant had cross-examined the
witness.” And like Roberts, Crawford re-affirmed Green and Mattox. Id. at 57
(citing Green and Mattox for proposition that “preliminary hearing
testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity
to cross-examine”).
This Court has also repeatedly affirmed the admission of an
unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, most recently this
year. Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶¶38-42, __ P.3d __; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
402-03; State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638
P.2d 537, 540-42 (Utah 1981). For example, in Brooks. There, four transients
fought each other in the “hobo jungle” over $14. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 538.
Two of the men were charged with aggravated assault, and the other two
testified against them at a preliminary hearing, where they were cross-
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examined. Id. When the victims were later declared unavailable, their prior
testimony came in at trial over Brooks’s confrontation objection. Id.
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test—which
governed confrontation clause questions at the time—but explained that the
reliability of the testimony sprang from a preliminary hearing, “with all its
formalities and protections.” Id. at 540-41.

And it rejected Brooks’s

argument that preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity
to cross-examine based on the limited purpose of the hearing, explaining
that the defense’s “motive and interest are the same” at both preliminary
hearing and trial—to establish the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 541.
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin,
2016 UT 47, ¶¶40-42.
The court of appeals has followed suit. See State v. Goins, 2016 UT
App 57, 370 P.3d 942, cert. granted, 384 P.3d 567; West Valley City v. Kent,
2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d
1014. This Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, ¶39
(holding that Garrido is “[c]onsistent” with Crawford and Menzies). And at
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least three federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible
under the confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445
(5th Cir. 2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v.
Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d
649 (Haw. 2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v.
Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476,
479 (Nev. 2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006);
Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United
States v. Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
deposition testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v.
State, 234 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (same); People v. Yost, 749
N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (same).
B.

Pham has shown no compelling reason to depart from this
long-established, and correct, precedent.
Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Pham asks this Court to

reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings—due to
their limited purpose—are all but per se inadequate to afford a defendant
the

opportunity

to

cross-examine

a

witness

“absent

exceptional

circumstances.” Pet.Br. 15-16, 22. This Court should decline to do so.
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It is true, as Pham points out, that preliminary hearings take place
early on in a case and are generally limited to determining whether
probable cause exists. Id. It is also true that there is no right to confront
witnesses at preliminary hearings, and that the State may choose to present
written statements in lieu of live testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 1102; State v.
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590.
But where the State elects to present live testimony, defendants
do have a rule-based right to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(1). Where
there is a prior opportunity to test credibility through cross-examination,
confrontation is satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan.
2007) (holding no confrontation violation from admission of preliminary
hearing testimony where defendants are not barred from cross-examining
witnesses at preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485
(similar).
Though Pham asserts that there “was no cross-examination regarding
[the victim’s] credibility and veracity,” Pet.Br. 9, this side-steps the issue.
The Supreme Court in Owens made clear that cross-examination need not
even necessarily take place—the defendant need only have the opportunity
to cross-examine. 484 U.S. at 559. Contrary to his assertion, id. at 19, Pham
had that. And as shown, counsel did explore several avenues in cross,
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including the victim’s background, marital status, failure to pay hospital
bills, interactions with police the day of the incident, relationship to those
involved, ability to perceive, memory, and details of the incident. R291:14–
26.
Further, however limited other preliminary hearings might be, the
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held “closely
approximat[e] those that surround a typical trial”—the victim was under
oath; Pham was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the
opportunity to cross-examine the victim without any limitation; and the
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also
Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary hearing testimony reliable where
it was “given under oath before a judge and Menzies was represented by
counsel who had the opportunity to cross-examine” the witness). And
tellingly, though Pham discusses potential shortfalls in preliminary hearing
cross-examinations, Pet.Br. 19-22, he points to nothing in this case that
counsel might have done differently. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶18 n.2
(holding that Pham did not “identify any shortcomings in the crossexamination actually conducted at his preliminary hearing. Rather, [he]
simply urged [the court of appeals] to hold, as a matter of law, that Utah
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preliminary hearings never provide defendants with sufficient opportunity
to cross-examine witness so as to satisfy the Confrontation Clause”).
In pressing his position, Pham relies largely on (1) Utah’s Victim
Rights Amendments to the state constitution permitting the use of reliable
hearsay at preliminary hearings; and (2) People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo.
2004). Neither is persuasive.
After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible. See Pham, 2016
UT App 105, ¶17 n.3. This overturned this Court’s decision in State v.
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings.
But the possibility of the State proceeding—in other cases—on
reliable hearsay rather than live testimony at preliminary hearings does not
affect the federal constitutional analysis. If the State had relied on affidavits
in lieu of live testimony here, then there would have been no opportunity
for cross-examination, and the victim’s statements would not have come in
at trial.
Pham also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Pet.Br. 22-26.
But Fry is unpersuasive. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
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because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for crossexamination. Id. at 977. But as shown, the Supreme Court rejected this very
sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as Green and Roberts.
And whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally, the one here
retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme Court and
this Court have held most critical—an oath, a judge, a witness able to be
cross-examined, and a defendant represented by counsel.
Further, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which Fry
relied—People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979)—in Brooks. Fry cited Smith
for the proposition that “due to the limited nature of the preliminary
hearing, the opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause.” 92 P.3d at 977. Brooks argued that former rule
of evidence 63(3)(b)(ii)—in light of Smith—showed that preliminary hearing
testimony was inadmissible. That rule stated that hearsay statements were
admissible if the declarant were unavailable and “the adverse party on the
former occasion had the right and opportunity for cross-examination with
an interest and motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the
action in which the testimony is offered.” Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. Brooks
argued that Smith showed that defense counsel’s “motive and interest”—
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and thus opportunity to cross-examine—were different at preliminary
hearings than at trial. Id.
This Court disagreed—and directly rejected Smith’s reasoning—
holding that defense counsel’s “motive and interest are the same” at both
preliminary hearing and trial” and that “cross-examination takes place” at
both “under the same motive and interest.”

638 P.2d at 541. Thus, a

preliminary hearing afforded an adequate opportunity for crossexamination. Id.; see also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (“At the preliminary
hearing and trial, Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the
same defense counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to crossexamine” the witness); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. Ct. App.
2006) (“Mohamed’s interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would
have been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim’s] recantation as
credible and prove that her out of court statements were unreliable.”).
Contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning, Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶17
n.3, this aspect of Brooks was unaffected by the later constitutional
amendment permitting the use of reliable hearsay.
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fry’s reasoning.
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright
declined to follow it. This is because Fry’s extreme outcome results in “a
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blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness”—which the “majority of courts do not condone.” State v. Mantz,
222 P.3d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no.
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to
follow Fry); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339–40 (Haw. 2015) (refusing to
follow Fry’s “complete ban on preliminary hearing” testimony in favor of
reviewing each decision on “case-by-case basis”); Stano, 159 P.3d at 945
(refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state witnesses
at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v. Aaron, 218
S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to follow Fry despite
defendant’s admittedly different “interest and motive in his crossexamination” at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010; (refusing to follow Fry and holding
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and
at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fry because
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see
also O’Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831–32 (10th
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir.
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2010) (affirming lower court even “if defendant’s cross-examination of
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have
been conducted differently” if counsel knew the witness would be
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828–29 (10th Cir.
2006) (affirming lower court’s admission of preliminary hearing testimony
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel’s prior crossexamination).
Pham cites a few cases from other jurisdictions purportedly following
Fry to buoy up his claim, Pet.Br. 23-27, but they are unpersuasive for the
same reasons that Fry itself is unpersuasive. They are also distinguishable.
State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005), for example, did not adopt a per
se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony, like the Colorado court did
in Fry. It merely stated that when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on
credibility issues, a confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution
later tried to use that testimony at trial. Id.at 266. There, both parties agreed
that the restricted preliminary hearing cross-examination of defendant’s
brother did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause, and the court agreed. Id. at
265.
Coronado v. Texas, 351 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), as Pham
acknowledges, “did not involve preliminary hearing testimony,” but an
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interview of a child witness where there was no opportunity for crossexamination under oath. Pet.Br. 24. And Blanton v. State, 978 So.2d 149 (Fla.
2008) involved a deposition.
Pham also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them
persuasive.

He alleges—without citation or evidence—that if defense

counsel were required to fully cross-examine at preliminary hearings “there
may be little time left for judges to conduct actual trials.” Pet.Br. 19. But the
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been
admissible at trial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks. The
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads.
And Pham’s “assumption that there are thousands of cases” in which
defendants “are entitled to a preliminary hearing,” and that hearing them
all would put a “burden on already strained judicial resources,” Pet.Br. 1920, is beside the point. Having the right and exercising the right are two
different things. The vast majority of defendants waive their preliminary
hearings—or plead guilty, thereby waiving their confrontation right. Cf.
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (noting that 97% of federal
convictions and 94% of state convictions result from guilty pleas); Missouri
v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (same); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (listing
confrontation right among those waived by guilty plea). Because the law is
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so long-established, recent decisions affirming the admission of prior
preliminary hearing testimony could not have created—as Pham asserts—a
“climate of uncertainty” regarding the extent of defense counsel’s duties in
cross-examinations at preliminary hearings. Pet.Br. 20. It has long been
certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant were
unavailable, the defendant had counsel, and counsel were able to crossexamine the witness.
Pham also asserts that evidence discovered after the preliminary
hearing often affects cross-examination at trial, and that a preliminary
hearing conducted before all discovery is available to the defense
necessarily renders the prior opportunity inadequate. Pet.Br. 21. But it is
not apparent that, should such evidence arise, it would be inadmissible.
Indeed, the victim in Garrido, though absent at trial, was extensively
impeached with evidence obtained after the preliminary hearing.

See

Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶22; see also Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541 (noting that
defense counsel were unaware of some evidence during preliminary
hearing, but nothing prevented counsel from presenting the inconsistency
to the jury at trial).
This Court also addressed that circumstance in State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 402-03 (Utah 1994). Menzies’s former cell mate, Walter Britton,
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testified at Menzies’s preliminary hearing that Menzies confessed to killing
the victim. Id. at 401. At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to
testify, despite the court holding him in contempt. Id. The trial court ruled
Britton unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at
401-02.
On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part
on his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred
between preliminary hearing and trial. Id. at 403. This court affirmed,
explaining that while it “agree[d] that new evidence obtained after the
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton’s credibility on crossexamination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue
was well-explored.” Id.
Pham has not met his heavy burden of convincing this Court that a
long line of authority stretching back more than a century—and approved
by this Court as recently as last October—has become unworkable or was
incorrectly decided in the first instance. See generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at
398. The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham’s proposed rule.
Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford an
adequate

opportunity

for

cross-examination

“absent

exceptional

circumstances.” Pet.Br. 22. In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an

-32-

unavailable

declarant

is

generally

admissible

absent

exceptional

circumstances, such as where a magistrate significantly limits crossexamination on credibility issues.
Finally, there are important policy reasons to reject Pham’s nearblanket approach. In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should
not walk free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being
cross-examined at a preliminary hearing. As the Mattox court explained,
“To say that a criminal . . . should go scot free simply because death has
closed the mouth of” the victim “would be carrying his constitutional
protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that
the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an
incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.” 156 U.S. at 243.
Those “incidental benefits” included “testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness” and “compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.” Id. at 242-43. Cf. Green, 399 U.S. at 160
(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing
testimony even though it “may be true that a jury would be in a better
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be
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whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination” at
the time of the statement). Pham likewise argues these incidental benefits
compel a different result, Pet.Br. 19, but the Supreme Court long ago
rejected that argument. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
Fairness concerns are particularly acute in domestic violence and
gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to become
uncooperative—and thus unavailable—out of fear of the defendant, a
misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State’s
control. See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶¶4, 23-26 (discussing domestic
violence victim’s lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear).
C. Admitting the unavailable victim’s cross-examined
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Pham’s
confrontation right.
Pham’s arguments focus almost exclusively on other cases—
precedent, possible consequences, and the like, Pet.Br. 12-29—which the
State has responded to. But even if this Court disagrees with the State, it
should still hold that Pham has not shown a violation of his confrontation
right.
Even if—as Pham contends, id. at 22—it would be a rare case in which
a preliminary hearing would afford an adequate opportunity for crossexamination, this case qualifies. Other than the lack of in-person
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observation by the jury, id. at 19, 28 he points to no defect in or limitation of
the cross-examination that took place at preliminary hearing. Though he
asserts that “discovery was not complete” at the time, id. at 28, he does not
point to any evidence that later came to his attention that he would have
used had the victim appeared at trial. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶18-19
& n.4 (holding no confrontation violation because Pham did not allege
changed motive between preliminary hearing and trial, trial court did not
limit cross-examination, and Pham did “not identify any shortcomings in
the cross-examination” at preliminary hearing). And because he has not
identified what any of that evidence is, he has not postulated how it may
have tipped the credibility finding in his favor.
Likewise, he has pointed to no limitation—court- or self-imposed—on
his actual examination, let alone one so severe that it calls into serious
question the adequacy of his prior opportunity to cross-examine.

By

pressing issues not at issue here, Pham is essentially requesting an advisory
opinion, which this Court is loath to issue.

See UTA v. Local 382 of

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶19, 289 P.3d 582 (explaining that
Utah “courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering
advisory opinions” when there is not a “controversy directly affect rights.”)
(citations and quotations omitted). But at any rate, Pham has not shown that
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the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the victim, and this Court should affirm.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted on January 4, 2017.
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